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I. Introduction
This chapter explores issues in jury trials involving persons accused of committing acts of
international terrorism or financially or otherwise supporting those who do or may commit such
acts. The jury is a unique institution that draws upon laypersons to decide whether a person
charged with a crime is guilty or innocent. Although the jury is instructed and guided by a trial
judge and procedural rules shape what the jury is allowed to hear, ultimately the laypersons
deliberate alone and render their verdict.1 A basic principle of the jury system is that at the start of
trial the jurors should have open minds and regard the accused innocent until proven guilty.
The chapter raises issues about jurors’ assumptions of innocence in the aftermath of
terrorist bombings in the United States, England, Bali, Spain and elsewhere when persons are
persons accused of committing acts of terrorism or indirectly supporting terrorists through
financing organizations associated with terrorism. A study of a United States trial involving
charges of supporting terrorism is used to illustrate the problem, but the thesis of this chapter is
that the basic issues apply to trials that might be held in England, Australia, Canada or other
countries with jury systems.
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II. Contemporary International Terrorism
And Its Public Perception
While recognizing that terrorism can take many forms and may be driven by different
ideologies, the chapter is concerned with the era following al-Qaeda-inspired attacks on New
York City’s World Trade Center and the U.S. Military’s Pentagon Building in Washington in
September 11, 2001,2 the 2002 bombings in Bali that killed many Australians,3 the 2004
bombings in Madrid,4 the 2005 bombings in the center of London and ongoing fears in each
country about future attacks.5 The perpetrators of these attacks have been associated with alQaeda’s hostility to the United States and its allies because of their hegemony in political,
military and cultural spheres in the Middle East and other parts of the world. The perpetrators
have been members of the Muslim faith or linked in some way to that faith. Most are of Middle
Eastern or Pakistani ethnic descent. Many were citizens or legal residents of the country that
were the target of terrorism.
The threat is ongoing. Government leaders have informed their publics that the dangers
stem not just from those associated directly with al-Qaeda but organizations that share roughly
similar goals with that organization. Western-oriented governments have passed measures that are
directed toward not just the terrorists themselves, but also any persons who support those
organizations through financing or other means. Government-sponsored websites give detailed
accounts of terrorist threats and the steps that are being taken to counter the threats.6 Public leaders
in the United States, England, and Australia, among others, have continually emphasized the threat
of terrorist organizations to Western life-styles and political structures. This is not to claim that
these concerns and warnings are unwarranted, but the result is that whole citizenries consider
themselves to be victims.7 This sense of being a victim goes beyond just the threat of physical
harm to themselves, loved ones or acquaintances but also threats to their conceptions of their
deeply held personal values national membership and culture. Some of these attitudes have been
expressed in racial and religious slurs or violence against persons identified as Moslem or Arab.8
These attitudes have serious implications for the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury
because they may influence the way that jurors perceive and evaluate trial evidence. Not
everyone accused of acts of terrorism or of indirectly supporting terrorists is necessarily guilty.
The central issue is whether ordinary procedural safeguards of the jury system will be sufficient
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to ensure a fair trial or whether additional steps might be necessary. Because trial procedures—
and their underlying presumptions—differ from country to country a first step is to consider
these differences.
III. Comparative Perspective on Trial Prejudice
and Legal Remedies
Procedural Perspective
Among the more than fifty common law countries and territories that still retain trial by
9

jury the United States is unique in a number of important ways. The mass media have almost
unfettered ability to cover all phases related to a trial, including pre-trial hearings, as well as the
trial itself.10 In some state courts proceedings can be televised live. This access of the media
relates to the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment providing for freedom of the press and that
amendment’s interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, even before the age of mass
media, indeed, even before the American Revolution, trial procedures had begun to shift from
their English origins in that jurors were questioned about their biases by the two sides involved
in the criminal or civil dispute.11
Today, in the process known as voir dire jurors in the United States are questioned about
their biases and subject to challenges for cause or peremptory challenges before being seated on
the jury. In some high profile trials, particularly in state courts, the process of jury selection may
take days or weeks of questioning by the lawyers for the contending sides before a jury is seated.
Often the judge, with input from the two contending sides, will send the members of the selected
jury pool a lengthy questionnaire to be filled out before their court appearance and their answers
are used as a basis of voir dire questioning. Attention needs to be drawn to differences between
federal court trial procedures in comparison to many state courts. In most cases today the federal
trial judge, rather than the contending lawyers, conducts the voir dire questioning. The voir dire
is truncated, usually involving only a few questions about impartiality, although as I will
describe below, there are exceptions to this general rule. Additionally, federal courts prohibit
cameras of any kind in the courtroom.
Finally, despite the remedial procedure of voir dire, a change of venue is possible when
one of the parties can convince a judge that voir dire will be insufficient to obtain a fair and
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impartial jury. In other instances lawyers in federal courts have persuaded judges to expand voir
dire questioning and allow the parties to participate in the process.12
For our purposes here, it is also important to draw attention to another fact, namely that
American judges do not engage in ‘summing up’ the evidence during their charge to the jury. In
fact some state constitutions forbid the practice.13
In contrast to American practices, other common law countries place strong emphasis on
pre-trial, mid-trial and post-trial restraints on media.14 The contempt power of judges is used to
attempt to constrain media publicity that might affect jurors. In some instances post-trial
reporting may be controlled if it is believed it would jeopardize future proceeding against a
defendant or co-defendants or if it would otherwise bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. Going still further, jurors in these countries are either proscribed or strongly
discouraged from discussing jury room deliberations with representatives from mass media
sources. In most of these other countries jurors are forbidden to discuss the jury deliberations
with anyone.
Prior restraint is not a perfect remedy for trial prejudice. In an article in the Criminal Law
Review Corker and Levi have noted a shift in case law in England and Wales wherein courts
have recognized that pretrial publicity can cause substantial prejudice, in part because the
policing mechanisms are limited.15 Sometimes prejudicial publicity is generated before charges
are laid and sometimes afterward. In addition, focusing solely on media coverage does not take
into account potential prejudice arising from pre-existing prejudices against accused persons
because of their ethnic or religious identities or prejudice that can arise from widespread
community gossip about the alleged crime or the accused person.16
Concomitantly, these other common law countries rely heavily on the presumptions that,
first, jurors as called remain ‘impartial between the Queen [or State] and the accused’ and
second, that judicial instructions on their oath to be impartial plus guidance, including ‘summing
up,’ will off-set any biases. Finally, remedies such as a temporary stay of proceedings, or in
extreme cases, a permanent stay, may be made. In others a change of venue is considered as a
remedy.
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Australia and New Zealand have a similar approach to the criminal trial.17 There are
proscriptions about mass media reporting of substantive matters disclosed in pre-trial
proceedings and the press or other persons may not query jurors after trial with the intent of
publishing anything about jury deliberations. The jurors are chosen as randomly called from the
jury panel. After a limited number of peremptory challenges for each side are exercised, the
surviving jurors are seated. While theoretically available, the challenge for cause process is
almost never used. Change of venue is a remedy when there is a concern about strong prejudice
tainting the community. In England and Wales even peremptory challenges have been
abolished.18
Pretrial Prejudice Issues
The issue of pre-trial prejudice in the United States arising from media coverage has been
explored in great detail by both courts and academics.19 This coverage includes the trial of the
Timothy McVeigh for bombing the federal courthouse in Oklahoma,20 and John Walker Lindh,
the ‘American Taliban,’ captured when the United States invaded Afghanistan.21 The problem,
however, arises in other countries as well.
English courts have struggled with a number of cases infected with potential pretrial
prejudice.22 These are reviewed by Corker and Levi23 and by Naylor.24 The ‘Maxwell’ trial for
fraud in the administration of pension schemes posed major problems of prejudice because of the
massive negative media coverage throughout England and Wales and by the fact that pensioners
scattered throughout the country were affected when it was discovered that the pension funds
were insolvent.25 As a consequence Justice Phillips, deviating from contemporary English
practice, took the extra-ordinary step of interviewing prospective jurors in chambers in an
attempt to seat an impartial jury. More recently in R. v. Bowyer extensive media coverage of
Leeds United FC football player resulted in a mistrial due to media generated publicity and
difficulties when a second trial was attempted.26
Canada has struggled with issues of pre-trial publicity in a number of cases.27 These
include, but are far from limited to, the Mount Cashel cases involving sexual assaults by lay
Catholic priests on boys under their care in the Mount Cashel Orphanage in St. John’s,
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Newfoundland and the Bernardo trial involving the abduction, rape and killing of teenage girls
by Paul Bernardo and his wife, Karla Homulka.28
IV. Analyzing the Potential Effects of Prejudice:
A Social and Psychological Perspective
Dimensions of Prejudice
Psychological research has shown that prejudicial attitudes and beliefs can affect the way
that trial evidence is perceived and evaluated, with the juror tending to accept evidence consistent
with his or her prior beliefs and rejecting evidence inconsistent with those beliefs. In turn, the juror
constructs narratives or stories of causation and guilt based around those beliefs.29 Issues that have
high emotional elements appear to be harder to overcome than factual material.30 There is a
substantial body or research investigating the effects of media articles on attitudes of juror attitudes
and beliefs. This research on mass media effects is critical but incomplete. It has not substantially
addressed the effects of access to internet sites that often provides many details, correct or
incorrect, about upcoming trials. More important, however, the focus on mass media ignores the
sociological dimensions of trial prejudice. Prejudice is often embedded in a broader personal and
community context and may have powerful effects on juror attitudes and beliefs. This broader
context is especially important in considering trials of accused terrorists and their supporters.
In previous articles I have described an intellectual framework for thinking about juror
prejudice.31 It contains four categories: interest prejudice, specific prejudice, generic prejudice
and conformity prejudice.
Interest prejudice involves prejudices arising from a juror having a direct or indirect
stake in the outcome of the trial. Case law has recognized, for example, that someone being
affiliated with an accused may be deemed to be not impartial. In an article based on the John
Walker Lindh case, I drew attention to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and its aftermath and
argued that the attacks created fears not only about future physical attacks but also perceived
threats to American values and culture.32 Research has demonstrated that when deep-rooted
cultural and personal values are threatened, people respond with hostility to persons who are
perceived as outsiders or otherwise different.33
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Specific prejudice exists when the juror holds attitudes or beliefs about specific issues in
the case at trial that prevent the juror from evaluating the trial evidence with an open mind.
These attitudes and beliefs may result from many life experiences, including media coverage of
issues. Mass media coverage of events both helps to create public perceptions and reflects
community interests and attitudes. Rumor and gossip may generate prejudicial beliefs to jurors.
Research with actual trials has shown that the information on which these beliefs are formulated
is often erroneous and misleading.
Generic prejudice involves the transferring of pre-existing prejudices about categories of
persons or other entities to the trial setting. Generic prejudices come into play in the terrorist
trials by means of prejudicial attitudes toward Palestinians, Arabs and people of the Moslem
faith or perceived Moslem faith. In short, the category of person to which an accused is
perceived to belong, such as an Arab or Muslim, may invoke assumptions of guilt in addition to
the specific prejudice arising out of the long history of negative publicity leading up to and
including the charges against the defendant.
Conformity prejudice exists when the juror perceives that there is such strong
community reaction in favor of a particular trial outcome that he or she is inclined to reach a
verdict consistent with that perceived consensus rather than an impartial evaluation of the
evidence. This is one of the most important factors and deserves greater elaboration.
One of the founders of modern sociology, Emile Durkheim, observed in 1893:
“As for the social character of [penal] reaction, it comes from the social nature of
the offended sentiments. Because they are found in all consciences, the infraction
committed arouses in those who have evidence of it or who learn of its existence
the same indignation. Everybody is attacked; consequently, everybody opposes
the attack. Not only is the reaction general, but it is collective… It is not produced
isolatedly in each one but with a totality and a unity of purpose…”34
In a Canadian case involving the killing of a young child, a great deal of prejudice
developed in the community even though a defense lawyer had obtained an order proscribing any
media coverage.35 People gossiped because they saw the killing as an odious event relevant to
and reflecting on their community. The bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in
April 1995 with the loss of so many lives also caused discussion, rumor and gossip throughout
the United States. It threatened community values and evoked calls for the death penalty as
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punishment. Importantly, citizens of Oklahoma City, where the bombing occurred, were stronger
in their reactions and calls for justice than other Oklahoma communities. After reviewing
testimony and survey data trial judge Maitch of the U.S. District Court concluded that ‘the entire
state had become a unified community, sharing the emotional trauma of those who had become
directly victimized.’36 In the decision to move the trial from Oklahoma Judge Maitch reviewed
various evidence and concluded that Oklahomans were ‘united as a family,’ that there was
‘extraordinary provocation of their emotions of anger and vengeance,’ that there was ‘a
prevailing belief that some action must be taken to make things right again,’ and that the
common reference in articulating these feelings was ‘“seeing that justice is d o n e . ” ’
Psychological research on trial prejudice has distinguished between potentially biasing
factual beliefs and beliefs that have high negative affective content.37 Beliefs involving negative
affect are most likely to have effects on jury decision-making. For example, Honess, Charman
and Levi conducted a study involving a simulation of the Maxwell fraud trial, mentioned
above.38 The case involved four defendants accused of conspiring to defraud the beneficiaries of
company retirement funds. In the actual trial the defendants were acquitted, but many persons
were dissatisfied with the verdict.
The research was carried out some time after the trial had taken place and was intended to
explore the effects of attitudes on juror reasoning processes. Jury-eligible participants were
interviewed to determine their recall of the case and then asked to participate as jurors in a trial
simulation involving a six-hour video simulation of the trial using actors working from verbatim
transcripts and documents from the actual trial. The jurors were interviewed at four time periods
throughout the trial presentation.
The results showed that the degree of jurors’ factual recall of details about the Maxwell
case had minimal influence on juror judgments about the trial evidence. In contrast negative
attitudes associated with the case did have an effect, but in a complicated and unexpected way. In
the first interview period conducted during the simulation, jurors with greater degrees of negative
affect about the Maxwell case were not significantly different than those with lesser negative
affect. However, jurors with negative affective responses began to express reasoning favoring
guilt at the end of the prosecution’s case. This reasoning about guilt was maintained during and
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after the defense presentation. The authors of the research hypothesized that these jurors had
withheld judgment at the early stages of evidence presentation because they were waiting for
more evidence before reaching a decision, suggesting that the jurors were not preemptively
deciding guilt but rather the negative attitudes had led them to interpret the evidence using a
prosecutorial mental framework.
The Honess et al. study is consistent with previous research and is highlighted here because
it shows the subtle effects that negative attitudes can have on jurors’ reasoning processes.
There is not space to further review additional research in this chapter, but the basic
findings lead to the conclusion that prejudice can be manifested at various points in the trial
process and jeopardize an impartial evaluation of the evidence against an accused.39 Specifically,
(1) It can prejudice jurors’ initial assumptions about a defendant’s guilt;
(2) It can improperly influence the evaluation of evidence through selective attention and
weighting of evidence consistent with pre-existing biases;
(3) It can influence pre-deliberation preferences of verdicts;
(4) It can influence the initial distribution of juror verdicts that lead to the final verdict;
(5) It can promote jury deliberations that enhances the initial biases of the jurors;
(6) It can instigate a ‘rotten apple’ effect whereby one or more tainted jurors infect other
jurors with emotional appeals during deliberation.
(7) In the event that the evidence of guilt is near equipoise at the end of trial the deliberations
pre-existing juror attitudes can improperly tilt the jury toward a guilt verdict.
There is an important caveat to the implications of this research. Prejudicial attitudes are
most likely to have their impact when the evidence supporting guilt or innocence is near
equipoise. If the prosecution’s case is very strong or very weak, the fact that some of the jurors
hold prejudicial attitudes will not be of as much importance as when the evidence is close.
Prejudicial attitudes come into play when there is ambiguity that allows jurors to justify their
reasoning about evidence in a manner that is consistent with their pre-existing beliefs.
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Al-Qaeda-linked Trials Are Different than Routine Criminal Trials
As already indicated, after September 11, 2001 and the subsequent bombings in Bali,
Spain and London, trials involving persons accused of al-Qaeda-linked terrorism are different in
complexity and magnitude. All of the types of potential prejudice may be at play. There may be
extensive media coverage of related events well before charges are laid. Statements by authority
figures such as politicians and police, informal gossip, prejudicial racial and ethnic stereotypes of
the accused, fears of personal harm for oneself and for loved ones and widely shared feelings of
cultural victimization may all be present. A mere focus on mass media-based publicity deflects
attention from these other factors that can improperly influence jury outcomes.
Jurors Sometimes Lack Self-Awareness of Their Prejudice
Sometimes judges address the whole panel of assembled jurors about the need to be
impartial in deciding the case. They invite any jurors who believe they may not be impartial to
identify themselves and then excuse them. The assumption is that the remaining panel members
have open minds. A case study involving a Canadian couple accused of killing their child raised
serious questions about this assumption.40 Although the defense lawyers were successful in
obtaining a ban against pretrial media coverage, the death of the child aroused considerable
community gossip, including very strong feelings against the two accused. At trial the judge
addressed the whole panel of over 125 jurors and asked any persons who could not be fair in
judging the case to excuse themselves. Only a few persons did so. The judge then allowed a
challenge for cause in which jurors were randomly called and questioned individually. Many of
the persons who were questioned under this procedure admitted biases that they had not
disclosed in response to the judge’s original request to step forward. (Most were subsequently
excused from the panel.)
There are different reasons for not disclosing bias, including simple unwillingness to admit
bias in front of other jurors, but survey research in high profile criminal cases has shown that a
major reason for some jurors, often substantial numbers of them, may be that these jurors are not
self-cognizant of their biases. Another reason involves the tendencyto give socially desirable
responses, that is say what they believe is expected of them.41
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Telephone survey research for the expected trial of John Walker Lindh, the so-called
‘American Taliban,’ serves as a particular example. Mr. Lindh, an American citizen, was captured
along with Taliban fighters during the American invasion of Afghanistan.42 He was brought back
to the United States and faced numerous charges. In advance of trial surveys of jury-eligible
persons were conducted in the northern Virginia venue in which he was scheduled to be tried as
well as four other venues across the country: Chicago, Minneapolis, San Francisco and Seattle.
Citizens in Virginia were more likely to have been exposed to greater amounts of media
publicity than other areas of the country43 and the surveys revealed that Virginians were more
likely to have known persons killed in the attacks. Nevertheless, levels of hostility toward Mr.
Lindh, as expressed in the surveys, were generally similar across all five locations.
The survey first asked the respondent a lengthy series of questions about Mr. Lindh
before asking if he or she could be a fair and impartial juror for his trial. While some persons
said they could not be fair and impartial jurors, a substantial number said they could and
explained why. However, among the self-professed impartial persons many had just offered
responses to other questions that were in sharp contradiction to their professions of impartiality.
These responses are documented in detail elsewhere,44 but several examples help to illustrate the
inconsistencies and raise serious questions about the jurors professed ability to be an impartial
juror.
Respondent #165 asserted she could be impartial in deciding Mr. Lindh’s guilt or
innocence and explained why by saying ‘It must be proven with facts.’ Yet her just expressed
responses to other questions on the survey indicated that she had a ‘strongly unfavorable’
impression of the accused, that ‘he is a traitor,’ that he was ‘definitely guilty,’ ‘he killed
Americans and should be shot.’ That a jury’s not guilty verdict would be ‘very unacceptable,’
that he should experience ‘death by hanging’ for the reason that ‘I want him to feel pain.’
Respondent # 506 also said he could be an impartial juror by explaining, ‘I believe in the
system and that everyone should have a fair trial.’ But similar to Respondent #165 other
interview responses raise questions about his openness of mind. He said Mr. Lindh was ‘Punk-a
traitor’ who was ‘definitely guilty’ because ‘they captured him with a gun in his hand where [a]
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CIA agent was killed.’ This respondent further stated that if a trial by judge and jury found the
accused not guilty, he would find the verdict ‘very unacceptable.’
Respondent #514 explained that she could be an impartial juror because ‘I feel like it’s
my Christian duty to be fair, and listen to all of the things set forth in the courtroom; to me that’s
the most important thing - my responsibility as a citizen and my Christian duty to be fair.’ Yet,
like other respondents documented above, her earlier answers directly contradicted this
profession of ability to be impartial. She had just said, ‘I feel that he was a traitor to our country.
And now that he’s been caught, he’s trying to reverse his decision in order to avoid paying the
price;’ ‘It’s because I feel he was a traitor who embraced the life of terrorism;’ ‘He has to be
tried first but he was with them. He was training with them and didn’t have a very good attitude
when he was captured.’
In short, as these examples illustrate, there can be a substantial disjuncture between
professions of having an open mind as a juror and expressed feelings and beliefs about an accused.
V. Case Study: The Trial of Dr. Sami-Al-Arian
Background: United States v. Sami Al-Arian
Professor Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian legal resident in the United States, holding a
doctorate from an American university, was a professor of computer science at the University of
Southern Florida.45 Since the 1990s Professor Al-Arian had been an outspoken and harsh critic
of United States policies toward Israel and the Palestinians. Since 1995 he had been the subject
of negative news coverage by the Tampa and St. Petersburg, Florida newspapers. In 2003 AlArian and others were charged with supporting the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement. Shortly
after, Al-Arian was fired from his tenured university position on the grounds that he had
improperly used his university position in support of Palestinian causes.
In 2005 Professor Al-Arian and three other men were scheduled for trial on multiple
charges, including conspiracy to commit murder abroad, money laundering and obstruction of
justice associated with other charges that the men had helped to organize and finance the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a designated terrorist group that was responsible for more than 100
deaths in Israel and the occupied territories. The Attorney General of the United States declared
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in front of national television cameras that the charges were an important strike against terrorism.
Local and national newspapers carried many stories on the background leading up to the trial.
Almost 1000 articles related to Al-Arian in the Tampa Bay Tribune and St. Petersburg Times
between January 2001 and mid-April 2005. No systematic data were available for newspaper
coverage in the decade before 2001, but the number of articles would number in the hundreds,
perhaps higher. Al-Arian’s notoriety played a prominent role in the 2004 primary elections for a
U.S. Senate seat when the former University of South Florida president, Betty Castor, running
for that seat, was heavily criticized in advertisements for not firing Al-Arian much earlier than
she did, and this probably contributed to her defeat. In those ads Al-Arian was described as a
‘suspected terrorist.’ Local television coverage of the arrest and charges was intense, including
detailed television coverage of Al-Arian being led off in handcuffs after his arrest. Commentary
alleging his guilt was featured on the nationally syndicated Fox network’s ‘O’Reilley Factor’
television program.46
Al-Arian and the co-defendants denied that they condoned violent activities, and that any
promotion of Islamic Jihad was protected by political speech permitted under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. They further contended that their money-raising efforts
were to support Palestinian charities. If convicted, Al-Arian and his associates each faced several
life sentences.
Concerns About Trial Prejudice
With this background as context a series of questions arose about the ability to obtain a
fair and impartial jury. Had the community been tainted by the long controversy involving Dr.
Al-Arian and the relevance of the controversy to the Tampa Bay area from which the jurors
would be drawn? To be sure, the case received nationwide attention and was taking place in the
still-resounding aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, but the saturation of and relevance
to the Tampa Bay community was extremely high. The Tampa Bay area has a large Jewish
population that, some speculated, would be especially offended by Al-Arian’s verbal attacks on
Israel and Jews. In addition, the Tampa Bay area has a sizeable population of persons of Arab
background and Muslim religion, many of whom are not American citizens. There was indirect
evidence of endemic prejudice in the area against Arabs and persons of the Islamic religion.
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Juror Questionnaires
As noted above, in contrast to common perceptions about the American trial process,
jurors in most federal courts, as opposed to state courts, are subject to limited pre-trial
questioning. Questioning is usually conducted only by the trial judge.
The defense teams for all of the accused were concerned about whether they should seek
a change of venue or a lesser remedy, such as an extended voir dire with lawyer participation in
the process. At minimum there was a need to provide evidence that, if extraordinary prejudice
existed there was a need for an extraordinary remedy. On prima facie grounds the trial judge was
persuaded to send prospective jurors a lengthy questionnaire developed in conjunction with the
lawyers for the prosecution as well as the defense. The questionnaire contained 83 questions with
the additional instruction that the juror should explain answers in their own words on the
questionnaire and not consult with anyone else about how to respond to the questions.47
A letter accompanied the questionnaire from the court. The juror was instructed to omit
his or her name and simply identify use an assigned juror number. The final page of the
questionnaire required the juror to declare as follows: ‘I declare under penalty of perjury that the
information which I have provided in this juror questionnaire and any attachments is true and
correct. I further declare that I have completed this questionnaire without anyone’s assistance.’
The questionnaire was sent to 500 randomly selected names using the court’s normal procedures
for drawing a jury panel.
Responses on the Questionnaires
As a first matter in considering the data, the court’s juror survey raises questions about
response rates. Of the 500 hundred questionnaires only 328 were returned. Sixty-eight surveys
were returned because the person had moved. Discounting those persons, the sample would be
432, but 104 questionnaires unanswered, yielding a response rate of only 76 percent. This is
surprising since the survey was an official command of the Federal Court. Possibly many
persons ignored the command because they did not want to serve in a trial that might last as long
as six months. But there is another possible reason, namely fear for personal safety. Fear os the
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serving as a juror may have been a significant factor in the low response rate. This issue is
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The juror questionnaire contained open-ended questions that required the potential jurors to
explain in their own words reasons behind their beliefs. It concluded with three crucial questions.
Question 81 asked, ‘Is there any reason that you could not be completely fair and impartial to the
defendants in this case?’ Question 82 asked the same question about being fair and impartial to the
government? Question 83 then asked the juror to explain affirmative answers to either of these two
questions. In response to the question about being impartial to the accused 34% of jurors declared
themselves to be biased. No respondents said they were biased against the government.
What were the bases of this lack of impartiality? In the limited space available for this
chapter I offer several edited examples. Some statements are in italics to draw especial attention
to what the prospective jurors said.
Juror 009: [I have] read newspapers, O’Reilley’s Spin Zone TV Newscasts and CNN
News, O’Reilley said he believed Al-Arian was guilty and he would spy on him everywhere he
went in order to get evidence; I heard that while Al-Arian was a Professor at University of South
Florida he was also raising money to sponsor terrorist groups. I have discussed the case with
my husband and sister-in–law. I was angry; I feel he is guilty and should be punished. Yes, it
(election controversy) would [bias me]; Mr. Martinez accused Mrs. Castor of doing nothing
when the accusations about Al-Arian were made public; I feel he is guilty. Yes [I would be
biased]. [Al-Arian is] guilty. Government [law officials] found evidence which incriminates him.
Juror 204: I wondered why it took so long to build a case against Dr. Al-Arian. It seems
like the evidence was there a long time before they arrested him. I wondered how he could stay
and live in this country without being asked to leave. I believe on what I have seen on TV, he
should have been arrested a long time before he was. Yes, I think he is 99.9% likely to be guilty
of what he is charged with based on what I have seen heard, and read on TV and in the
newspaper; I believe that Dr. Al-Arian along with his partners helped to raise money and funnel
that money to organizations that are against the U.S. Yes, having lived with the hate that Arabs
and Palestinians have for the U.S. makes me wonder why we would give assistance to these types
of individuals or countries. Yes [I am biased] [Al-Arian is] guilty. Everything that I have read
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and heard about this case has led me to believe that he and his group are guilty. I would have a
hard time being fair and impartial to people who take life for granted.
Juror 124: If Sami Al-Arian is on record for supporting these ‘charitable’ groups that are
actually terrorist groups, then I believe that he is someone who supports/incites terrorist attacks
or activities against the United States. Right now I think he is guilty. There would have to be
overwhelming evidence to convince me of his innocence. I don’t know if that labels me impartial
or not; Guilty. Footage aired on TV news allegedly shows Sami Al-Arian speaking in support of
terrorist groups and activities. Sami Al-Arian has ties directly or indirectly to Qaida or other
terrorist groups. I already think he is guilty based on news and publicity. I am assuming that it
means that I am not impartial.
Juror 316: I feel they are both guilty of terrorism acts against the U.S.; I feel Al-Arian is
a threat either directly or indirectly to the U.S. citizens, and that he is guilty of the crimes as
charged. Yes, my opinions are formed and extremely unlikely to change. What I’ve read/heard
points to Al-Arian’s guilt when he’s labeled a terrorist. Yes, very difficult to be impartial.
Reports on the defendant’s connection to terrorist organizations, money laundering charges,
monies paid to individuals to carry out suicide attacks; Terrorism charges are hard to swallow
after 9/11; if you live in America you should not be involved in activities that are harmful to
American citizens.
Juror 480: Too much to state here—read and followed everything I could. I have a
daughter attending USF in Tampa and the jerk was a professor there. Sami Al-Arian looks like a
Moslem Radical to me; Sami is probably one of those ‘kill the infidels;’ He’s probably had a
hand in fund raising for terror organizations. …What do you think! I saw him all sweaty and
screaming with laundry wrapped on his head on those films clips. Looked obvious to me. I think
he’s guilty of fund raising for terrorists. What I’ve read and seen in the media you can take my
vote now and save all that taxpayer money. Remember 911? I think Sami is guilty!
However, questions like Q81 frequently evoke socially desirable responses about being
impartial that may be inconsistent with actual attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, I examined the
total responses to the juror questionnaire of persons who declared themselves not biased and
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found 17 additional jurors who were inconsistent. Consider some edited examples from persons
who professed ability to be impartial:
Juror 120: They are accused of funding terrorist activities and plots and make out like
ordinary people; It has been going on so long, most of the facts are forgotten by all, [I have]
outrage that he’s at least somewhat behind this; I’m not sure (it would be difficult to sit as fair
and impartial juror). [He is] guilty. The government has tons of evidence of at least some acts
and has been shown these people could pull a 9/11 on us. They were in Tampa.
Juror 139: [I have seen] TV news reports, newspaper articles, comments from my
parents. I feel that Sami Al-Arian and his supporters are liars and terrorists and that they use our
freedoms in the U.S. as a cover for their terrorist activities. I think he is a terrorist. Yes [it would
be difficult to sit as fair and impartial juror]. He is Guilty. [I base my feelings on] What I have
read and heard from the newspapers and my parents.
Juror 320: [I have seen] newspaper and TV stories leave me to believe they are all guilty.
They had the funds and opportunity to do these things. [I am] upset that others can come to
America and get away with anything. The man and all of his co-defendants are guilty! Yes, [it
would be difficult to sit as fair and impartial juror]. I feel that the group had been planning some
terrorist activities for a long time. They had been spreading the word to others around the country
for more support and were never stopped. Yes, [it would be difficult to sit as fair and impartial
juror]. Yes [from what I have heard] he is guilty. [I have formed an opinion that he is] guilty. As
stated before, the group … had plenty of papers, etc. which proved what they were doing. I feel the
government will have enough evidence to prove their case before coming to court….
Classifying these additional respondents as ‘not impartial’ leads to an estimate of 129 of
328 persons with very strong biases, or 39% of the sample.
Interest Prejudice in the Community: The Effects of September 11, 2001
Research for the John Walker Lindh (‘American Taliban’) case, as described above,
documented the strong reactions that the attacks of 9/11 had on the American public. The attacks
were seen not only in terms of physical fear, but also feelings of hostility arising from strong
emotional reactions that American values and culture were being attacked. Similarly, in the Al17

Arian case many jurors mentioned the September 11, 2001 attacks on various questions in the
lengthy survey. One question asked jurors if they believed Palestinians were involved in the
2001 attacks. Consider these examples: Juror 004; ‘Sept.11;’ Juror 008: ‘I have family and
friends living in New York and are still suffering from 9/11 attack;’ Juror 018, ‘The events of
2001 and subsequent involvement impact on entire society…;’ Juror 025: ‘As with 9/11, these
people demonstrate the ability to live amongst us unnoticed...; Juror 038: ‘Every American was
affected by 9/11 & I wonder and fear what could be next;’ Juror 362: ‘Friends and family
associates murdered on 9-11-01.’
Interest Prejudice: Fear of Being a Juror in the Al-Arian case
Consider Juror 280’s answer to a question about serving on the Al-Arian jury: ‘Due to the
nature of the case, I would potentially fear for the safety of self and family.’ Juror 414 said: ‘It is
important my identity be kept secret from the defendants and from the media.’ Juror 343 asked:
‘What if these defendants are found guilty? What about retaliation against the jurors? What’s to
stop their terrorist affiliants from coming after us? Or bombing the courthouse, etc.(?).’
Similarly, Juror 367 wrote ‘I think the biggest fear of people to serve on this jury will be reprisal.
How do you know if you are in harm’s way from these people? I feel intimidated.’ Juror 422
said: ‘If these men are guilty and associated with terrorists how safe will it be for myself and
family?’ Juror 178 expressed a similar concern: ‘I am worried that my fear of terrorists would
affect me to be fair and impartial’
Generic Prejudice Regarding Moslems, Arabs/ Palestinians and Non-citizens
A number of items in the lengthy questionnaire gave respondents the specific opportunity
to express any attitudes or beliefs that they had about Palestinians and other Arabs and toward
Moslems. One set of questions asked whether non-citizens were entitled to the same
constitutional protections that citizens are accorded. Both jurors who declared that they could not
be impartial and those who either did not answer questions or who declared themselves to be
impartial on the matter of Mr. Al-Arian’s guilt expressed many beliefs and attitudes that show
negative stereotyping of Arabs and Moslems. Fully 50 percent of jurors expressed a view that
Arabs/Palestinians or Muslims were more violent than other ethnic groups or were responsible in
some way for the September 11 attacks on the United States. Many jurors would not accord non18

citizens the same rights of free speech that citizens have, particularly when it is seen as,
‘espousing terrorism’ or ‘degrading the USA.’ Some were even more explicit such as juror 480
reported above who said, ‘[I saw] him all sweaty and screaming with laundry wrapped on his
head on those films clips.’
Community/ Conformity Prejudice
It is clear from juror responses, both those admitting bias and those who did not express
opinions on guilt, that extensive Tampa Bay area television, radio and newspaper accounts about
Mr. Al-Arian had been watched and read by the whole community. Many of these opinions
apparently developed prior to the charges being laid against the accused, although they were
fanned by subsequent media coverage. Mr. Al-Arian’s residence, employment, and publicized
speeches and alleged terrorist-supporting activities occurred in the community in which he was
being tried. Some respondents drew attention to this fact with a sense of concern or even of
outrage. As a group, the jurors who answered the questionnaire appeared very aware of many
details about Mr. Al-Arian. The jurors were cognizant that a not guilty verdict might be met with
outrage by some of their friends, family and co-workers. This raised a reasonable concern that a
juror or jurors might be influenced by community feeling about the proper verdict in the trial.
The Trial and Its Outcome
Based on the juror questionnaire responses and survey research findings tendered by
other defendants, the trial judge deviated from customary procedures. He conducted some
preliminary questioning of prospective jurors himself and then allowed both defense and
prosecution lawyers to conduct further questioning. A number of jurors were dismissed on
hardship grounds because of the expected length of the trial and other jurors were dismissed by
the judge ‘for cause’ based upon their questionnaire answers and their in-court examination.
Other jurors were dismissed through peremptory challenges. The final jury consisted of twelve
persons plus four alternate jurors, who would replace any jurors that, for illness or other reasons,
would be dismissed before the jury reached its verdict.
The trial lasted six months. The government produced over 100 witnesses, many flown in
from Israel specifically for the trial. Other evidence consisted of hours of surreptitious Federal
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Bureau of Investigation wiretaps of conversations involving Mr.Al-Arian and other defendants.
After the prosecution closed its case, Mr. Al-Arian’s defense counsel concluded the
prosecution’s case was so weak that there was no need to call defense evidence. After final
arguments and judicial instructions the case was placed in the hands of the jury. After thirteen
days of deliberations the jury rejected the charges that Mr. Al-Arian and the three co-defendants
operated a North American cell for Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The jury unanimously found Mr.
Al-Arian not guilty of conspiring to commit murder abroad, money laundering and obstruction of
justice; it could not reach consensus on other counts. Two of the other defendants were acquitted
of all charges and a third was found not guilty of the main charges and the jury could not reach
consensus on the remaining charges.48
Reflections on Jury Trials Involving Charges of Terrorism
Each case has unique characteristics and must be evaluated on its own terms. Prior to trial
public opinion surveys were also undertaken for the Al-Arian case.49 The results suggested that if
the trial were held in Atlanta Georgia, a city in the same federal judicial district as Tampa, some
of the problems of media publicity would have been much less. Possibly fears of jurors about
retaliation expressed in the Tampa area would have been less. Possibly prejudice against persons
associated with Islam or Arab culture would have been less.
Conceivably there was still some prejudice among the Al-Arian jurors who rendered the
not guilty verdicts. If the government’s case had been stronger, those prejudices may have come
into play. Prejudices are likely to have their strongest influence in instances when the evidence is
ambiguous. The Honess et al. study, described earlier, and related research indicates that strong
negative attitudes and beliefs have a subtle and invidious impact on the way that jurors interpret
trial evidence.
Post-charge media coverage in the Al-Arian case greatly added to the problems of the
defense. Because of contempt laws accused persons tried in England, Australia, or Canada would
not have been subject to the same media coverage. On the other hand, negatively toned media
coverage of events prior to the laying of charges might occur in these other countries, just as
occurred in the Maxwell trial. At least for the near future, the prior bombings and terrorist threats
have created an atmosphere of fear of and hostility toward terrorism that may lie in the minds of
20

prospective jurors. Problems of community gossip, generic prejudices against Moslems and
Arabs, and juror fears of retaliation after a conviction might well be present, possibly even in
greater degrees than were present in the Al-Arian case. Research on the Al-Arian jurors’
response to the pre-trial questionnaire as well as research involving other cases indicates that
jurors may hold strong prejudices but still profess an ability to be an impartial in deciding guilt
or innocence. A jury randomly selected from a population holding such prejudices would not
produce a fair and impartial hearing of the charges. It would seem that, similar to the steps taken
in England’s Maxwell case, a trial judge should consider extraordinary problems that may
accompany terrorism trials and be willing to take extraordinary steps to ensure that the jury
consists of persons who can weigh the evidence fairly and impartially. The nature of these
procedures will, of course, have to be sensitive to the common law procedural practices of the
particular country.
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